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Abstract: In microsimulation literature a limited number of models are provided with a module 
aimed at analyzing and projecting the evolution of private wealth over time. However, this issue 
appears crucial in order to get a comprehensive evaluation of the likely distributional effects of 
institutional  reforms  adopted  to  cope  with  population  ageing.  In  this  work  we  describe  the 
implementation in the Italian dynamic micro simulation model CAPP_DYN of a new module in 
which household’s savings and asset allocation are modelled. In particular, our efforts are addressed 
at accounting for some possible behavioural responses to pension reforms in household savings. To 
this end, we rely on an approximate life cycle structural framework for estimating saving behaviour, 
while adopting the traditional stochastic micro simulation approach for assets allocation. In line 
with Ando and Nicoletti Altimari (2004), we emphasize the role of lifetime economic resources in 
households’  consumption  decisions,  yet  we  further  account  for  internal  habit  formation  and 
subjective  expectations  on  pension  outcomes  in  the  econometric  stage.  In  addition,  we  model 
intergenerational transfers of private wealth in a probabilistic fashion.  
Despite possible saving responses to pension reforms, simulated results for the period 2008-2050 
suggest a rising dispersion in saving propensity and intergenerational transfers received are largely 
responsible for the predicted increase in disposable income inequality in the next decades which, 
differently from the recent past, will also affect the group of elderly.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
In microsimulation literature a limited number of models are provided with a module aimed at 
analyzing and projecting the evolution of private wealth over time
1. Introducing a wealth module in 
a dynamic MSM indeed brings undoubted advantages yet it also entails some drawbacks. On the 
one  hand  the  modelling  of  wealth  permits  researchers  to  draw  a  more  complete  picture  of 
disposable  income  dynamics  (i.e.  labour  plus  capital  income  components)  and  therefore  of 
households' well-being distribution, thus also allowing the future redistribution effects of reforms 
that will affect – as expected in Italy – both public and private pension pillars to be analyzed. In 
fact, private wealth becomes crucial both in analyzing overall wellbeing after retirement and, ex 
ante, in affecting saving/investing as well as retirement decisions.  
On the other, however, it significantly increases the model’s complexity, and explicitly raises the 
debated question of the choice between a mechanical and a behavioural approach.  
 In fact, the former one also called ‘probabilistic’, assumes relations estimated (through reduced 
forms) on data to be structurally stable over a period of about 50 years. To our knowledge, existing 
models – especially population based ones - including a wealth module have relied mainly on an 
arithmetical-probabilistic  approach,  providing  a  deterministic  representation  of  transmission, 
accumulation and decumulation of financial and real wealth, while being added to with several 
stochastic processes in order to account for heterogeneity and uncertainty in the dynamic simulation 
of all variables.  
Differently,  the  ‘structural  dynamic’  approach  models  economic  variables  as  a  solution  of  a 
utility maximization problem subject to institutional framework constraints, and attempt to account 
for second round (behavioural) effects, which could either strengthen or offset the first order impact 
of reforms. In this second scheme, a value function characterised by uncertainty in one or more 
arguments  is  maximized  and  the  solution  is  derived  by  backward  recursion  under  dynamic 
programming.  
We recognize the introduction of a module accounting for the role of private asset accumulation 
and spend down - beside the dynamics in social security wealth - as a crucial step in order to give a 
comprehensive  evaluation  of  the  likely  distributional  effects  of  institutional  reforms  adopted  in 
order to face one of the most complex challenges of modern welfare states, namely population 
ageing.  To  this  end,  the  present  work  aims  at  developing  and  endowing  the  dynamic  micro 
simulation  model  CAPP_DYN
2  with  a  new  module  in  which  households’  savings  and  asset 
allocation are modelled.   
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In particular, our efforts are addressed at accounting for some possible behavioural change in 
household savings. To this end, our strategy has been that of approximating a structural framework 
for simulating consumption behaviour, while adopting the traditional stochastic micro simulation 
approach  for  assets  allocation  (investments  decisions).  The  introduction  of  some  form  of 
behavioural response is in fact extremely important in micro simulation models aimed at analyzing 
long run effects of radical reforms in the social protection system as long as these are expected to 
affect saving decisions.  
On the one hand indeed, and in line with the nature of CAPP_DYN, the wealth accumulation and 
spend down module allows the representation of several processes characterized by a high degree of 
institutional details by means of a large set of empirical ‘ad hoc’ solutions. On the other hand, since 
savings behaviour can be strongly affected by radical reforms, the traditional probabilistic approach 
based  on  reduced-form  estimations  on  current  data  would  fail  to  represent  long  run  relations, 
especially when reforms have not yet been fully phased-in, due to a long transitional phase. In such 
cases, in order to account for changes in expectations and to give a proper account of household 
saving decisions, the empirical model needs to be "clasped" onto a theoretical framework.  
Our framework has been inspired from a basic version of the life cycle-hypothesis as formulated 
in Ando and Nicoletti Altimari (2004) (henceforth AN) as most of the assumptions they made in 
order to obtain a computable algebraic expression for the household consumption rule as well as 
several of their enlightening ‘heuristic’ solutions, appeared reasonably compatible with the nature 
of our model. However, while AN aimed at making a forecast for the evolution of aggregated 
savings, we are mainly interested in a long-run distributional analysis of income, consumption and 
wealth, especially during individuals’ retirement. 
To better represent behaviours and catch heterogeneity in a micro framework, we also allow for 
internal habit formation, as this hypothesis is very helpful in reconciling the life-cycle theory with 
most of the empirical evidence on household inter-temporal decisions (see, among others, Meghir 
and Weber, 1996; Seckin, 2000; Angelini, 2009). Therefore, as in the original AN microsimulation 
analysis,  we  emphasize  the  role  of  life  cycle  economic  resources  in  households’  consumption 
decision, however we further modify their empirical model in order to account for habit persistence 
and subjective expectations on pension outcomes in the econometric stage. In addition, we allow for 
liquidity constraints on consumption expenditure in the simulation program.  
The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of the new Wealth module we have developed, 
highlighting some specific focal points and presenting some illustrative results for the Italian case. 
In the next section we briefly outline the functioning of the Wealth Module by illustrating the 
sequencing of the main tasks. Following, in section 3, we describe the theoretical background for  
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modelling the behaviour of households in distributing resources for consumption over the life cycle. 
In order to achieve this aim, we focus on the estimation of household lifetime human resources - 
and their specific components (section 3.1 and 3.2) - a key variable employed for the estimation of 
the consumption rule explained in section 4, which represents one of core processes of the dynamic 
simulation. In section 5 we discuss the empirical strategy for modelling intergenerational transfers 
and their mechanics in the simulation program. Finally, section 6 shows some selected results. 
 
2.  The Wealth Module Sequence 
 
The Wealth Module of CAPP_DYN starts the simulation from the panel dataset provided by the 
pre-existing blocks of the model, where demographic events, labour incomes and a full range of 
social security benefits are simulated for the period 2008-2050
3. In keeping with the previous part 
of the model, the base year population is represented by the 2002 wave of the Bank of Italy’s 
Survey of Households Income and Wealth (SHIW). As the SHIW suffers from a heavy financial 
assets under-estimation due to under-reporting, we use the adjusted wealth data from D’Aurizio et 
al. (2006) on the same source
4. 
The sequence of processes for the mechanisms of formation, transmission and spend down of 
household wealth are given in summary form in figure 1.  
The module adopts the traditional recursive logics of dynamic MSMs , included CAPP_DYN. In 
addition, some of the simulated processes have a dynamic specification themselves and have been 
estimated on the panel component of SHIW using the lagged dependent
5 among the covariates. The 
decisional unit for the wealth processes is the household. 
For  simulation  purposes,  we  adopt  a  re-coding  of  SHIW  wealth  variables  into  two  macro-
aggregates:  (a)  house  equity  (real  wealth)  (b)  an  enlarged  financial  wealth  component,  which 
includes all financial assets plus tangible goods other than real estate (which will be assimilated into 
non-risky  assets).  Net  worth  is  obtained  by  subtracting  financial  debt  (if  any)  from  total  gross 
wealth.  
As  mentioned  above,  the  first  simulated  events  are  the  intergenerational  transfers  of  wealth 
between parents and children outside the family of origin (inter vivos and mortis causa). The inter-
vivos transfers have been modelled by means of a probabilistic approach based on a Heckman two-
step  procedure  in  order  to  account  for  the  selection  bias.  Bequests  instead  have  a  mechanical 
connotation. It is worth noticing that, due to insufficient information on financial transfers in the 
SHIW for our purposes, we have used a different micro data source that specifically focuses on this  
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issue:  the  Survey  of  Health,  Ageing  and  Retirement  in  Europe  (SHARE).  Details  on  the 
econometrics and the functioning of this sub-module are discussed in section 5.1.  
Next, the model performs an updating of wealth stock by assigning a specific return to each 
assets in order to determine current wealth value (as a random walk with drift). Returns are derived 
from an iid draw from a specific normal (or Pearson) distribution with mean, variance (and kurtosis) 
derived from available time series for Italy. This step introduces the individual portfolio risk in 
private accumulation process. The current house equity value of household h, (AH
t) is obtained as: 
where
t t-1 t t 2
h h AH, AH AH = AH (1+ r )   r ~ N(  σ )
6. 




8  assets,  we  preliminarily  estimate  financial  wealth  allocation  between  these  two 
components with a dynamic model accounting for persistence in attitude to risk
9 and for the role of 
other observables with a selection model à la Heckman. Since (in the baseline) we assume the non 
risky share of financial wealth accrues a null real return, the weighted rate of return on overall 
enlarged financial assets amounts to ￿
trf 
t , where the latter rate is a specific return on financial risky 
assets obtained as an iid draw from a asset-return-specific distribution
10. The updated value for the 
enlarged  financial  aggregate  for  the  household  (AF
t)  is  then  determined  as: 
where
t t-1 t t t-1 t 2
f f AF, AF AF = (AF )(1+φ r )+ S    r ~ iid(  σ ) and S is the flow of yearly household saving. 
The outstanding debt is, in the first instance, obtained by subtracting the capital component of the 
mortgage instalment paid in the previous period (
t-1
cap R ) from its lagged value (
t-1 B ). Here we adopt 
the convention that all households repay their mortgage over 20 years
11 (i.e. roughly the average 
mortgage duration in Italy, according to Rossi, 2008). 
We assume the borrowing rate – rm – normally distributed with mean 3% and standard deviation 
equal to 0.5% to be fixed over time once the mortgage has been subscribed and the mortgage 
repayment to be constant. The net wealth is then given by the sum of real and financial wealth 
minus  the  outstanding  debt  (i.e.  mortgages  being  the  only  form  of  borrowing  we  allow  in  the 
model).  
In  the  following  step  the  model  simulates  choices  affecting  the  stock  of  real  estate  and  the 
number of dwellings owned by the family.  
The decisions to buy or sell a house work on a set of discrete choice models (logit, estimated on 
the  pooling  of  1989-2006  waves  of  SHIW-HA)  combined,  in  simulation,  with  Monte  Carlo 
techniques. The totals are then calibrated to match an official external source (ISTAT, 2005)
12. 
First, the model distinguishes between households that already own at least one house, which are  
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allowed to sell a property, and households that do not own a house equity, which are not allowed to 
sell. 
Once  the  family  is  selected  for  the  “sale”  event,  the  value  of  house  equity  sold  AHs
t  is 
“heuristically” assumed to be the current value of real wealth divided by the number of houses 
owned. The new value of household real wealth is the difference between the current real wealth 









The financial wealth is assumed to increase by the value of equity that may exceed the existing 
debt  { }
t t t t
s AF = AF +max 0,AH - B , while the latter (if exists) falls by the price of equity sold up to 
its outstanding value { }
t t t
s B = max 0,B - AH ; finally, the new mortgage (total and capital) instalment 
is computed on the new debt (if any)     
t t 20 20
tot m m m R = B (1+r ) r ((1+r ) -1) ;
t t
cap R = B 20.  
When  a  household  is  selected  –  through  a  similar  procedure  –  for  buying,  the  value  of  the 
purchased dwelling (AHb
t) is estimated using an OLS on a pooling of SHIW cross sections (1989-
2006) using the ratio of house value to household net wealth as the dependent variable. The model 
distinguishes among three cases:  
i.  purchase with down-spending of up to 90% of the enlarged financial wealth; in this case 
financial wealth decumulates by the price of the house bought, real wealth increases by the 
same amount and any debt does not vary; 
ii.   if the price of the house exceeds the 90% threshold, the financial advance can be added to by 
creating  new  debt  for  the  difference  between  the  house  value  and  the  90%  of  financial 
wealth: ˆt t t t
b B = B + AH -0.9AF ; real and financial wealth are updated accordingly; 
iii.  if at least one of the two spouses has an accrued end-of-service allowance (TFR)
13 and the 
purchase  concerns  the  first  house,  a  70%  redemption  of  it  is  allowed  as  a  set-off  of  debt 
contracted in ii): ˆt t t t t
b acc B = B +max(0,AH -0.7TFR -0.9AF ), with any difference exceeding the 
debt  being  added  to  the  financial  wealth  (decumulated  by  90%): 
ˆ t t t t t
b acc AF = AF -min(0,AH -0.7TFR -0.9AF ) 
Finally, since the issued debt may be excessively high due to low financial assets relative to the 
price of the house, we control mortgage sustainability by setting a ceiling to the (total) instalment, 
as the 40% of the current household net labour and pension income
14. If the instalment exceeds the 
threshold,  we  force  the  instalment  to  the  ceiling 
t t
tot R =0.4y and  re-calculate  the  maximum 
sustainable debt given current resources:     
t t 20 20
sust tot B = R (1+r) r ((1+r) -1)  
Subtracting the pre-existing debt from this amount, one obtains the maximum amount that can be 
loaned in the current period to buy the house: 
t t
sust diff = max(0,(B - B )). Finally, the maximum 
value of the house bought in keeping with the new stock of debt is re-calculated by adding the 90% 
of  financial  resources  to  the  maximum  amount  that  can  be  loaned  for  the  current  period 
(
t t




In the last steps of the loop the model predicts household human lifetime resources, which are the 
present discounted value of labour incomes stream until retirement plus the pension income flows 
until  household  extinction  (see  section  3.1  and  3.2  for  details).  This  aggregate  is  crucial  for 
determining household consumption expenditure
15. Finally, yearly household savings are obtained 
as the difference between disposable labour and pension incomes (net of mortgage instalment) and 
consumption: 
t t t t
tot S = y - R -C .  
 
3.  Households’ Saving/Consumption Behaviour 
 
In this section we illustrate the theoretical background of modelling households’ behaviour in 
allocating resources for consumption over different periods of their life. Our aim is to estimate a 
general consumption rule in order to catch some possible behavioural reactions related to gradual 
changes in pension outcome expectations as a consequence of a radical social security reform which 
is characterized by a long transitional phase. 
Assuming  a  homothetic  -  non-separable  over  time  -  utility  function,  a  closed-form  lifecycle 
consumption function from the optimization problem as elaborated in Modigliani and Brumberg 
(1954 and 1979) can be derived. Hence, our general formulation - in order to get an approximate 
optimizing model - is given by: 
f
¥
    ∑ t+i
i t+i t+i t+i-1 t
t a a a
C i=0
t-1
t t t t a-1
a a a a
Max  E U (C ,C ; H )  
s.t. 
A




a = age of household head 
t
a C = current consumption 
t-1
a C = last period consumption for the same household (internal habit) 
 
t
a A  = non-human household wealth in year t when the age of the household head is a  
t
a y = current household disposable income (earnings and pensions) in year t when the age of 
household head is a  
￿ = period constant probability of household extinction 
H = household characteristics and type 
r = real interest rate  
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Following Willman (2003) we can derive an algebraic expression for current consumption which 
in its implicit form is given by: 
( )       
t t-1 t-1 t t
a a a-1 a C (H)= f C ; a,π,H; A , y  ,HR (r,H,a)                                                                           (1)  
where, in particular, HR represents the (expected) lifetime human resources (or human wealth) 
given by the discounted future labour and pension incomes stream. The "structural" element of the 
equation lies in the introduction of expectations about future income stream, through the role of 
human resources, as a determinant of household consumption. 
1 t
a C
-  represents the role of habit in 
consumption. 
For  the  estimation  we  chose  an  empirical  specification  which  well  describes  the 





1 2 k k t t-1
k
C C
= ρ + f(a)+ β A + β y + β D (H)
HR HR
16                                                                           (2) 
The  implications  of  such  an  empirical  specification  and  the  econometric  estimation  will  be 
discussed in section 4. 
In the dynamic simulation program, this equation provides us with a predicted value  for the 
current level of consumption  ˆ t C . To account for the role of liquidity constraints - which should not 
be neglected in a distributional analysis - we compute current simulated consumption as: 
{ } ˆ         
t t t t t t
tot C = min C , y +(1-φ )AF -R                                                                                      (3) 
i.e. current household consumption can never exceed the sum of current disposable income plus 
the liquid share of enlarged financial wealth (non-risky assets), net of the mortgage instalment (if 
any). 
 
3.1 Household lifetime human resources (HR)  
In  this  section  we  focus  on  the  definition  of  total  household  expected  human  wealth,  the 
estimation  of  which  is  preparatory  to  estimating  the  consumption  rule.  The  expected  value  of 
human  wealth  is  empirically  obtained  by  aggregating  spouses'  individual  projected  (after  tax) 
incomes (earnings and pensions), plus the stream of adult children's expected labour incomes up to 
the age of 30, plus one year of earnings contribution of active children over 30
17.  
In algebraic terms:  
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( ) ( ) ( )
£
 
                   
   
         
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
￿￿ ￿￿ ￿
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
j k k k k k
j k
k k
t t t 30-a p -a T -a -p 2 J j,a +i k,a +i k,a+i t
i t k i i i i
k=1 i=1 i=1 j=1 i=1




HR (i,H,a)= E + E I  + E
1+r 1+r 1+r











resources up to 30
              (4) 
where: 
k = 1,2 adult members 
j = active children up to 30 living in the household 
k
t
k,a +i w = net labour income of household member k (or j) expected in year t when he/she will be 
aged a+i 
t
k,a+i P  = net old-age pension benefit of household member k expected in year t when he/she will be 
aged a+i, or, if already retired, projection of current old age (or survivor) pension benefit in year t 
when he/she will be aged a+i 
pk = expected retirement age for spouse k 
ak = age of spouse k 
Tk = expected death age for spouse k (according to ISTAT projections) 
Therefore,  in  order  to  evaluate  this  (stock)  variable  we  need  to  evaluate  its  three  main 
components, that is the household lifetime labour income, the expected social security wealth for 
active  individuals  and  the  current  (residual)  social  security  wealth  for  the  individuals  who  are 
already retired. It is worth noting that, in the simulation program, the predicted values of estimated 
equations used to build HR are re-computed – using the current simulated values of explanatory 
variables - every year so as to obtain the current value of HR which, in turn, is a determinant of the 
yearly simulated consumption.  
 
3.1.1  Individual lifetime income profiles  
Individual lifetime earnings are defined as the present discounted value of future expected labour 
income flows up to the planned age of retirement. The projection in t for income at time t+i (where 
i is a generic period between t – current year – and the age of retirement (pk - t)) for each individual 
k or j is obtained as the prediction of the following econometric models where age is ak+i: 
( )
( )
t t t t 2
k,a+i k,a+i-1 k,a+i k,a+i k k u
t t t 2
k,a+i k,a+i k,a+i k k ν
    
or
    
lny = ρlny +β'x +γ'pa +u   if  wage>0 in t  u ~ N 0,σ
lny = β'x +γ'pa +v           if  wage=0 in t   ν ~ N 0,σ
 
                             (5a) 
                              
                             (5b)  
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where  , ln
t
k a y is the log of individual labour income net of personal income tax and social security 
contribution,  the  x  vector  includes  the  set  of  observables  such  as  educational  level  achieved, 
occupation, type of employer, full (part time), pa is a polynomial in age vector that interact with 
individual characteristics.  
We use two models estimated on the panel component of SHIW using 1989-2006 waves to obtain 
a projection of labour income until retirement. 
In particular, we use a dynamic specification to estimate the process to be simulated when the 
individual  has  a  positive  wage  in  the  current  period  (which  represents  the  lagged  variable  for 
predicting the expected wage for the following year) (5a), while we use a static specification to 
estimate the process for active individuals with zero wage, e.g. in the case of unemployment (5b), 
which is fitted on both employed and unemployed individuals. 
Hence, the present value of the expected labour income at a generic age a+i,  , j
t
k a i y +  is given by 
the predicted value of the earnings model when age=a+i: 





k,a +i-1 k k,a +i k k
k
(ρlny +β'x +γ'pa ) t i
k,a +i
1
y = e (1+g)
1+δ
                                                                           (5c) 
where the (1+g) factor allows the wage level to be linked to the medium-long run productivity 
growth which is calibrated through the “Scenario” block of the pre-existing CAPP_DYN
18 modules. 
For simplicity, we assume δ (the inter-temporal discount rate) to be equal to g.  
Finally, in order to obtain individual lifetime income, we need to sum the present value of the 
projected labour incomes for every t from the current period up to the expected retirement age pk. 
However, pk is not known a priori either. 
Indeed, pk, along with the expected replacement rate  , j
t
k p w , plays a key role in determining both 
lifetime income as well as the expected social security wealth. In the following section, a method 
based on subjective expectations declared in SHIW coupled with conjectures about their evolution 
is illustrated in order to estimate these two variables. 
 
3.1.2 Planned retirement age and (related) expected replacement rate 
Reforms implemented in Italy from 1992 to 2007 have significantly affected the institutional 
social security framework, introducing a tight actuarial link between contributions paid and pension 
received back, sharply reducing the expected replacement ratio for future pensioners but assuring 
the long term financial sustainability of the social security system. 
These new computational rules will affect incentives to retire. While for those whose pension is 
calculated with the old defined benefit (DB) formula the expected retirement age can be reasonably  
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expected  to  match  the  legal  provision  (or  the  age  at  which  individuals  accrue  the  seniority 
requirements),  for  workers  instead  falling  under  the  mixed  and,  especially,  under  the  notional 
defined contribution (NDC) regime, the expected retirement age presents troublesome elements. In 
fact, we need to model the behaviour of individuals who will have to face very different scenarios 
and will therefore not be able to draw from the experience of previous generations.  
For this purpose, since we consider subjective expectations to matter in economic decisions, we 
use  the  expected  replacement  rate  and  the  planned  retirement  age  information  reported  in  the 
SHIW
19  survey  and  we  build  an  econometric  model  for  imputing  out-of-sample  values.  Data 
support  the  hypothesis  of  an  increase  in  the  expected  retirement  age  and  a  decrease  in  the 
expectations on future replacement rates if we consider recent survey waves, suggesting a partial 
internalization of the effect of pension reforms in the process of expectations-formation. 
Since the planned retirement age (plan_ret_age) and the expected replacement rate (exp_repratio) 
are slightly negatively correlated (ρ=-.14) but part of their variability may be jointly determined, 
there is a strong likelihood that there will be a correlation between plan_ret_age and the error term 
in the model of expected replacement rate
20. In order to better account for this kind of endogeneity 
we  then  choose  to  fit  a  three-stage  estimation  for  systems  of  simultaneous  equations,  since 
plan_ret_age is simultaneously the dependent of the first equation and an explanatory variable in the 
second equation (exp_repratio) of the system.  
With regard to the first equation of the system (table 1), i.e. the planned age of retirement, we can 
notice the contributive seniority (and its square) has a negative coefficient while in order to account 
for the effect of age and its strong collinearity we interact the latter with the former. Then, we can 
interpret  its  positive  and  significant  coefficient  as  a  counter-effect  of  age  (perhaps  due  to  an 
adjustment of individuals’ planning when they approach to retirement), given the expected negative 
impact of seniority. Time dummies catch the slight extension in planned retirement in the more 
recent waves, while cohort dummies do not suggest a clear cut pattern apart from the fact that 
individuals who were born after 1953 plan to retire later than older individuals. 
Looking at the second equation, the expected replacement rate, we can see how the simultaneous 
estimation  corrects  the  endogeneity  of  planned  retirement  age  as  a  regressor  by  estimating  a 
positive, significant, coefficient; the contributive seniority, as expected, has a positive impact while 
its interaction with age has a low significance, small, negative effect. Individuals which fall under 
the NDC pension scheme expect, on average, 6 points less in their future replacement rate. Also in 
this equation, but with a more clear pattern, time dummies catch the recent (downward) revision in 
pension outcome expectations, while cohort dummies surprisingly show, other things being equal, 
that the younger the cohort the higher the expectation about future replacement rate. This evidence  
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provides us with a further clue about the incomplete internalization of pension reforms, especially 
by younger individuals, who are expected to bear the heaviest burden of the reform itself. 
 
 
 Table 1: Three-stage least-squares regression of planned age of retirement and the expected 
replacement rate 
Equation  Obs  Parms  RMSE  R-sq  chi2  P    
1.Plan_ret_age  27194  21  3.435451  0.257  9408.45  0.000 
  2.exp_repratio  27194  21  0.163388  0.149  5034.9  0.000    
 Planned Age of Retirement  Expected Replacement Rate   
   B     Se 
 
B     Se 
Year_contrib  -0.5005  ***  0.0117  Plan_ret_age      0.0026  **  0.0008 
Year_contrib
2  -0.0094  ***  0.0003  Year_contrib  0.0065  ***  0.0007 
Age*contrib.  0.0146  ***  0.0003  Age*contrib  -0.00003  *  0.00001 
Female  -2.085  ***  0.0445  NDC  -0.0602  **  0.0205 
NDC  0.6392     0.4316  Single  0.0095  *  0.004 
upper_secondary  0.2882  ***  0.0473  Upper secondary  0.0147  ***  0.0022 
degree_or_more  0.9429  ***  0.0722  Degree or more  0.018  ***  0.0035 
self_employed  1.2191  ***  0.0548  Self emplolyed  -0.1161  ***  0.0028 
Public  -0.2453  ***  0.0541  Public  0.0404  ***  0.0026 
home_owner  -0.113  *  0.0473  Partime  -0.0395  ***  0.0041 
South  0.6049  ***  0.0496  Centre  0.0349  ***  0.0025 
Single  0.6131  ***  0.085  South  0.0424  ***  0.0026 
tau2002  0.2049  ***  0.0594  tau2002  -0.0339  ***  0.0028 
tau2004  0.4154  ***  0.0618  tau2004  -0.0506  ***  0.003 
tau2006  0.1333  *  0.0651  tau2006  -0.0789  ***  0.003 
coor_53  1.2315  ***  0.0881  coor_53  0.0119  **  0.0041 
coor_58  2.1149  ***  0.1063  coor_58  0.0221  ***  0.005 
coor_63  2.3574  ***  0.1239  coor_63  0.0334  ***  0.0056 
coor_68  2.3954  ***  0.1403  coor_68  0.0449  ***  0.0061 
coor_73  2.2184  ***  0.1547  coor_73  0.0607  ***  0.0064 
coor_78  1.9241  ***  0.1718  coor_78  0.0704  ***  0.0069 
Intercept  61.2566  ***  0.1635  Intercept  0.4337  ***  0.0539 
Endogenous variables:  plan_ret_age, exp_repratio 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 2000-2006 
 
 
In the light of this empirical analysis, since the expectations-adjustment process of has not been 
fully  completed,  it  would  be  unreasonable  to  assume  that  pension  expectations  will  remain 
unchanged into the future. On the opposite, we guess these expectations to become increasingly 
accurate over time.  
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Therefore, the projected values for these two variables pk and 
j
t
k,p ω (both generically called y) are 
computed as a weighted average between the values predicted by the econometric model above (ŷ) 
and the values simulated by the “Pension module” (y*) of CAPP_DYN for individuals retiring 
during  the  simulation  period  (within  2050).  For  the  younger  individuals  not  retiring  in  the 
simulation period, we assume the predicted value of the model to converge linearly towards a long 
run  mean  value  estimated  (by  a  regression  on  the  2045-2050  simulated  data)  for  population 
subgroups. Therefore: 
y = ￿ ŷ + (1- ￿) y*                                                                                                                        (6) 
The weight of this average ￿Î(0,1) becomes closer to zero the closer the year of simulation is to 
2050 (i.e. the more the pension outcomes of the new NDC regime become observable) and the more 
the worker is close to his/her retirement age (the closer one is to her retirement age, the more one is 
aware about the exact moment of retirement and about pension amount). 
          
0.5 0.5 1
γ = [1 -  *(t -2003)]*(l -1)/ l
2050-2003
l= year of retirement - t
                                                                        (7)  
Although actual simulated future values are exogenous to the Wealth module (at the state of the 
art feedbacks from this latter to the former modules are not yet allowed) nevertheless, the social 
security  module  of  CAPP_DYN  -  following  a  rule  of  exit  essentially  playing  along  with  the 
increase in the legal provision - provides an evaluation of the pension benefit that is consistent with 
a  given  seniority  and  with  the  computational  rules  related  to  the  particular  pension  scheme  an 
individual falls under. In other words, we assume that, given a simulated labour market exit-age 
which only partially adjusts to offset the future decreasing pension coverage, the expectation about 
the implied replacement rate should converge towards this actual value.  
 
3.2 Social Security Wealth 
In  order  to  estimate  the  expected  value  of  future  pension  benefits,  the  model  computes  the 
expected value of the first annuity by multiplying the estimated expected replacement rate  , j
t
k p w by 
the projection of last labour income (in pk-1) : 
k kj k
t t t
k,p k,p k,p P =ω y                                                                                                                              (8)  
The expected present value of future pension flows is obtained as the sum of present values of 















SSW = P         
1+r
                                                                                                       (9)  
Finally, SSW values are discounted back to the current period and are aggregated for the spouses. 
By aggregating the life-time labour incomes component plus the pension component the model 
produces an estimate of the expected value of household human resources (HR). 
 
4.  Estimation of the Consumption Rule 
 
In  this  section  we  discuss  the  specification  and  the  estimation  of  the  consumption  rule,  the 
parameters of which we use in the simulation program. As mentioned in the introduction, the idea 
driving  our  approach  is  that  the  likely  impact  of  radical  social  security  reforms  on  the 
consumption/savings age profile of Italian households asks for a step beyond the estimation of a 
traditional reduced form Keynesian equation. In fact, if we look at the recent past (i.e. our 1991-
2006 panel dataset, figure 2) through a set of kernel regressions, we notice that the (equivalent) 
savings profile of Italian Households is characterized by a nearly flat pattern from about 35 years 
on, with pensioners having, on average, a positive propensity to save even at older ages. 
A  broad  literature  has  investigated  the  so  called  “retirement  consumption  puzzle”  in  several 
countries (Lunberg et al. 2001, Fernandez and Krueger, 2003 and 2004). For Italy, some authors 
have explained - at least partially - the high (private) savings propensity of the elderly with the 
generosity of the social security system (Miniaci et. Al, 2003) which, so far, provided pensioners 
with rather high rate of returns on contributions and high replacement rates. Once the social security 
wealth is included in the total wealth, the savings profile of Italian Households turns to be more 
consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis, with a positive propensity until retirement and a spend-
down phase in the ensuing period.
21  
We believe that thinking of this pattern as given and projecting it into the forthcoming decades - 
when social security reforms will be fully operational and the generosity of public pensions will be 
much reduced - would miss an important part of the distributional story. In fact, reforms especially 
affect current  young  and future workers  whose lifecycle  consumption is not (or only partially) 
observed and whose expectations have only partially embodied the long-run effects of the reforms 
themselves.  We  therefore  believe  that  linking  consumption  behaviour  to  a  lifecycle  theoretical 
framework, while searching for a specification that fits our data more closely, is an appropriate 






Figure 2: Consumption and saving age profiles in the estimation dataset 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW 1991-2006, Nadaraya-Watson nonparametric regression, Euros 2002 
 
 
As mentioned in section 3, the empirical specification is the following: 
￿ ￿ ￿ ∑ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
t t-1
t t t t h h
h m m,h h h t t-1
m Polynomial Current Financial Households'
lagged  in age of the hh  Disposable Ass and hh
dependent and relative Incomes Characteristics
interactions Dummies
C C
= ρ + δ'pa + β D (H) +ψ lny +klnAF
HR HR ￿ ￿    (10)   J ￿ ￿ ￿
t t t
h h h h
Financial House
ets Debt Equity
+ςlnAH + lnPF +u +ε
Such a functional form, where the dependent is (log of the) consumption to HR ratio, proves to 
better fit our household consumption data across the distribution while considering the role of habit 
persistence
22  and  the  effects  of  future  expectations  about  incomes  and  pensions  outcomes  as  a 
crucial determinants of current consumption. Moreover, by estimating a propensity rather than a 
level, in the simulation program we can avoid having to make arbitrary assumptions due to the non-
stationary  nature  of  consumption  that  would  have  implied  a  moving  average  and  therefore  a 
dynamics in the intercept of the equation. 
In order to estimate the dynamic consumption function (10) we use a GMM system estimator 
(Arellano,  Bover,  1995;  Blundell,  Bond,  1998)  with  robust  standard  errors  so  as  to  purge  the 
estimations from the bias induced by the endogeneity due to the individual fixed effect.  
It has to be noticed that the periodicity  of the  survey means that the reference consumption 
propensity  is  the  two-year  lag  causing  a  weaker  estimated  persistence  parameter  (0.115)  when 
implemented in the discrete yearly simulation program.  
Both the enlarged financial wealth and financial debt have positive elasticities on the propensity 
to consume out of human resources while house equity shows a negative elasticity which, however, 
is to be evaluated in the light of the interaction with the number of owned dwellings. The positive 
sign of the interaction probably indicates a non-linear effect of real wealth on the dependent as 
owners  of  more  than  one  property  often  enjoy  actual  rents  (besides  imputed  rents  for  owner- 
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occupied dwellings) that constitute an extra-source of  (capital) income that can be allocated to 
consumption. It is worth noting the negative effect of household head being retired, which confirms 
the  well-known  one-off  drop  in  consumption  at  the  time  of  retirement.  Finally,  the  effects  of 
household types suggests that nuclear families - the reference (omitted) category- are characterized 




Table 2: Dynamic panel-data estimation of the consumption rule, two-step system GMM
23 
ln{C/HR}  B     se  t  Ci95    
Lag.ln{C/HR}  0.1152 ***  0.0259  4.4556  0.0645  0.1659 
ln_af_en  0.0128 ***  0.0026  4.8835  0.0077  0.0179 
ln_ar_h  -0.0244 ***  0.0052  -4.7274  -0.0345  -0.0143 
ln_ar_h*n_houses  0.0069 ***  0.0018  3.8106  0.0034  0.0105 
ln_pf  0.0135 ***  0.0019  7.1701  0.0098  0.0172 
Q2_income  -0.1185 ***  0.0197  -6.0043  -0.1571  -0.0798 
Q3_income  -0.1589 ***  0.0222  -7.1707  -0.2024  -0.1155 
Q4_income  -0.2282 ***  0.0249  -9.1813  -0.2769  -0.1795 
Q5_income  -0.2908 ***  0.0289  10.0710  -0.3474  -0.2342 
Age  0.1892 ***  0.0507  3.7288  0.0898  0.2887 
age
2  -0.0061 ***  0.0014  -4.4608  -0.0088  -0.0034 
age
3  0.0001 ***  0.0000  6.0067  0.0001  0.0001 
age
4  0.0000 ***  0.0000  -7.4470  0.0000  0.0000 
age_self  0.0010 *  0.0004  2.4646  0.0002  0.0019 
age_upsec  -0.0011 ***  0.0003  -4.1302  -0.0017  -0.0006 
age_degree  -0.0034 ***  0.0004  -8.1461  -0.0042  -0.0025 
Retired  -0.0704 **  0.0233  -3.0183  -0.1162  -0.0247 
earners_ratio  -0.2705 ***  0.0283  -9.5756  -0.3259  -0.2152 
South  -0.0505 ***  0.0119  -4.2364  -0.0739  -0.0271 
Single  0.0171    0.0198  0.8618  -0.0218  0.0560 
Nusihehh  0.1080 **  0.0355  3.0388  0.0383  0.1777 
non_nusihehh  0.3959 ***  0.0376  10.5271  0.3222  0.4696 
non_nuclfam  0.1787 ***  0.0163  10.9877  0.1468  0.2106 
tau1991  -0.0204   0.0167  -1.2196  -0.0532  0.0124 
tau1993  0.0500 **  0.0159  3.1525  0.0189  0.0811 
tau1995  0.0890 ***  0.0148  6.0144  0.0600  0.1180 
tau1998  0.0379 *  0.0161  2.3605  0.0064  0.0694 
tau2006  0.0232   0.0131  1.7736  -0.0024  0.0488 
Intercept  -5.7109 ***  0.7040  -8.1118  -7.0908  -4.3311 
Source: Author’s computations on SHIW data, Historical Archive, panel component, waves 1991-2006 
 
 
5.  The Intergenerational Transfers Sub-Module 
                                                           
5  It  is  worth  stressing  once  more  that  our  definition  of  non-nuclear  household  does  not  include  proper  “composite 
structure” families with more than two adult members (except children) living in. Actually, if we allowed for this group in 




This section describes the functioning of another important block of the Wealth module. Indeed, 
this part of the model proves to be of fundamental importance in modelling private wealth within a 
dynamic microsimulation framework that aims at explicitly accounting - in a probabilistic fashion - 
for inter-generational links
24 and therefore at evaluating the between-generations/cohorts role of 
private wealth transmission at the same time as a demographic and institutional transitions. From a 
micro perspective, intergenerational transfers may reduce inequality across generations but may 
conversely also increase economic disparities within cohorts and are thus an important channel for 
transmitting economic inequalities.  
The analysis of such phenomenon plays an important role in our study for at least two reasons:  
i) on the one hand, since the empirical evidence shows that the size of the wealth transfers is not 
negligible  (although  some  uncertainty  surrounds  its  exact  magnitude)  and  that  they  are  very 
concentrated,  assessing  the  main  statistical  determinants  of  such  choices  is  important  as  they 
significantly impact on the overall wealth distribution;  
ii) on the other hand, intergenerational transfers may support or even substitute social security 
transfers, especially whenever the latter will play a decreasing role in the future. The question is 
even more crucial when considering three main features of Italy’s demography and economy: the 
secular decline in fertility, which is greater than in other European countries, the high saving rate of 
the elderly and the mortgage market imperfections which, by causing big borrowing constraints for 
the young, would even further reduce their consumption capabilities as well as the decision and the 
possibility to buy a home without substantial private wealth transmission. 
Concerning the quantitative evaluation of such a phenomenon, data available for Italy are still 
narrow. The only two sources are the Bank of Italy’s Survey on Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW,  1992  and  2002  waves)  and  the  Survey  of  Health,  Ageing  and  Retirement  in  Europe 
(SHARE), which collects information on a representative sample of a cross country of populations 
for individuals over 50. According to Cannari and D’Alessio (2007) who use the former source, 
intergenerational  transfers  make  up  a  sizeable  share  of  Italian  households’  net  wealth:  direct 
estimates referring to 2002 range from 30 to 55 percent, depending on whether the income stream 
produced by transferred assets is included. Moreover, transfers would be concentrated on the top 
tail of the distribution and would therefore be an important factor in explaining wealth inequality 
persistence in Italy. 
Similar results have been found in works based on SHARE data. This survey, collects more rich 
and detailed information compared with SHIW on wealth (and time in the form of reciprocal care) 
intergenerational transfers and provides the possibility to carry out cross country comparisons. To  
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this end, Albertini, Kohli and Vogel (2008) show that the share of Italian households making a 
financial transfer in a year is smaller compared with northern countries’ families. However, the 
share of transferred wealth is higher compared with the European average. 
 
5.1 Implementation of the transfers sub-module in CAPP_DYN 
In  this  section  we  describe  the  structure  of  the  intergenerational  transfer  sub-module  of 
CAPP_DYN. This module includes the set of procedures which allow the transmission of financial 
and real (this latter only in bequest processes) wealth among the family units in every  year of 
simulation. 
In the simulation program, wealth transfers may occur inter vivos or mortis causa. The former 
involves redistribution of wealth from donor to recipient family units which are linked by ties of 
blood during their all life cycle. The latter occurs when a household extinguishes in the model 
(because all of their member died), through the distribution of net wealth (whether positive) among 
heirs. 
In the current release of the model we assume that the inter vivos transfer decisions depend on 
socio-economic characteristics of the observational unit. In other words, first the model determines 
such  characteristics  within  the  original  blocks  then,  conditional  to  these  observables,  wealth 
transfers are simulated. Therefore feedbacks from wealth decisions to demographic, occupational 
and pension choices are not allowed yet. The methodology we adopt in the inter vivos estimates is 
based on a traditional two part approach (where the first equation estimates the probability and the 
second the amount) and, in order to  control for possible selection biases, draws on the micro-
econometric literature of estimation using a control function. Therefore, we introduce a Heckman 
correction in the OLS estimation of the amount, whether it is needed. 
We  model  separately  the  two  sides  of  the  transfer  (donor  and  recipient).  Therefore,  for  the 
estimation, we also had to construct a child level dataset where the unit of analysis is the child’s 
family (which is more likely to be recipient), rather than his/her parents, by means of an “inversion” 
of the original dataset. We end up with two datasets. The original one, which we call “potential 
donors” and the derived one, which we call “potential recipients”
25. We then estimate the two sides 
of the exchange separately on the two datasets using, however, some mutual characteristics (i.e. 
recipients characteristic in the donor equation and vice versa). The inclusion of such characteristics 
in the equations (especially, controlling for parents financial wealth in the recipient regression) 
allows to explain a quite similar share of the variance of the dependent variables in the two outcome 
equations (i.e. transfers given and received), thus providing predicted values characterized by a 
quite similar variability. This property will prove to be important in the simulation stage in order to  
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avoid an excessive under-estimation of the intergenerational transmission of inequality through an 
unrealistic within cohort redistributive effect of private wealth inter-generational transfers.  
Finally,  since  we  are  interested  in  the  simulation  of  transfers  of  non-negligible  amounts,  we 
restrict the estimation to transfers greater than 1,500 euros. 
 The submodule is structured as follows: among households with a head aged over 50 and with a 
positive wealth in the previous period, the model selects those with the highest transfer probability. 
This  selection  follows  a  pseudo-random  lottery,  that  is  the  model  computes  the  deterministic 
prediction by means of a discrete choice model. Such a conditional probability (score) coupled with 
a Monte Carlo process allows us to select the actual donor households among those with the highest 
score. The model endogenously determine the donors’ share, depending on the interaction of the 
econometric  model  and  the  Monte  Carlo  stochastic  ranking.  The  second  step  determines  the 
transferred wealth as a share of household enlarged financial wealth. 
In  the  selection  equation  we  employ  a  binary  variable  that  is  equal  to  1  if  the  interviewed 
household  has  made  at  least  one  transfer  towards  children  or  grandchildren  in  the  12  months 
preceding the interview, otherwise it is 0. For the outcome equation the dependent is built as the 
logarithm of the transferred amount on donor financial wealth
26 (gross of transfer) ratio. 
Once  donor  households  have  been  identified  and  the  wealth  to  be  transferred  has  been 
determined,  the  model  updates  the  stock  of  household  financial  assets.  The  down  spending  of 
donors’ wealth is deterministically simulated by  subtracting the amount transferred by the pre-
transfer held stocks. The following step starts from the identification of the potential recipients of a 
wealth transfer.  
For the recipient model, the dependent variable is a binary that is equal to 1 if the observed child’ 
household  received  a  transfer  in  the  12  months  preceding  the  interview,  while  in  the  outcome 
equation the dependent is the logarithm of the transfer received
27. 
Among  the  covariates  of  the  recipient  model,  besides  a  polynomial  in  age  we  use  some 
occupational and household structure controls plus the existence of children (which in turn are 
grandchildren  for  the  donors)  and,  as  a  cross-explanatory  variable,  the  (pre-transfer)  financial 
wealth of the family of origin. 
In the tables 3 and 4 we report estimated coefficients for the two separate models. For the donors 
model, the evidence shows a lower probability  joint to a larger share of transferred wealth for 
Italian households; in fact, in the selection equation, estimated by means of a logit model, ITA 
dummy  coefficient  is  negative  and  significant,  while  in  the  outcome  equation  is  positive  and 
significant.   
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Belonging to higher net wealth quintiles still has a positive sign in the logit, but has a negative 
sign  in  the  outcome  equation.  Therefore,  the  better-off  households  show  a  higher  transfer 
probability but, as a share of their financial wealth, they transfer less compared to less-affluent 
families. Moving on to the recipients’ characteristics, the determinant role of some specific events 
in the recipients’ lives (such as unemployment, marriage, child birth) is confirmed and increases 
both the probability to be donors and the amount.  In particular, we use the latter variable, i.e. 





Table 3: Two-step estimation for intergenerational giving with Heckman correction 
Donor side 
Logit Probability of being Donor    OLS ln{Ratio } 
   B     Se     B     Se 
Age  0.0807  ***  0.0243  Age  -0.7785  **  0.2404 
age2  -0.0007  ***  0.0002  age2  0.0113  **  0.0036 
in work  0.3522  ***  0.052  age3  -0.0001  **  0.000 
Q3_wealth  0.4146  ***  0.0543  in work  -0.4384  ***  0.0866 
Q4_wealth  0.6046  ***  0.0531  Retired  -0.2449  **  0.0849 
Q5_wealth  0.6989  ***  0.0531  Unemp  -0.4619  **  0.1649 
child_unemp  0.2835  ***  0.0625  ch_unemp  0.3006  ***  0.0817 
wed_or_birth  3.2668  ***  0.1205  Q3_wealth  -0.5422  ***  0.0752 
upper_secondary  0.5074  ***  0.0463  Q4_wealth  -0.8931  ***  0.0736 
degree_or_more  0.742  ***  0.0502  Q5_wealth  -1.4278  ***  0.0733 
Ita  -0.2737  ***  0.0747  Ita  0.7029  ***  0.0951 
_intercept  -4.4368  ***  0.8158  mills_ratio  0.2653  ***  0.0414 
            _intercept  15.5409  **  5.3305 
Source: Author’s computations on SHARE data, wave 2004 
 
 
Turning to the recipient equations (table 4), due to the derived nature of the dataset, we can 
estimate only a model with a reduced number of covariates and no valid exclusion restrictions
29. 
Italian recipients show both a higher average probability and a greater average amount compared to 
the other European homologues. This evidence seems at odds with the lower giving probability in 
the table 3. Nevertheless, Italian households tend to transfer more often to all of their children when 
they  do  that  and  have,  on  average,  a  slightly  few  number  of  children  compared  to  the  overall  
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sample. Finally, a powerful determinant of transfer receiving is, as expected, the financial wealth of 
the family of origin. 
 
 
Table 4: Two-step estimation for intergenerational receiving without Heckman correction 
Recipient side    
Logit Probability of being Recipient  OLS ln{Amount} 
   b     t     B     se 
ln(af parents)  0.169  ***  0.0061  ln(af parents)  0.0892  ***  0.0079 
Age  -0.0883  ***  0.0105  Age  0.0253  *  0.0147 
age
2  0.0007  ***  0.0001  age
2  -0.0004  *  0.0002 
Married  0.3004  **  0.1119  Grandchildren  -0.1051  *  0.0567 
Single  0.6497  ***  0.1125  Married  0.1911  ***  0.0494 
Divorced  0.6462  ***  0.1288  Ita  0.2481  **  0.0944 
in work  -0.2689  ***  0.0403  _Intercept  7.028  ***  0.2699 
Degree  0.3421  ***  0.0414             
Grandchildren  0.2863  ***  0.0442             
Ita  0.1984  **  0.0709             
_Intercept  -1.3815  ***  0.2094             
Source: Author’s computations on SHARE data, wave 2004 
 
 
The (log) value of parents’ financial assets for family units without a potential donor in the sample 
in a period t is obtained as a draw from a normal distribution with mean and variance equal to the 
actual first and second moments of the financial wealth distribution among over 50 families in 
period t
30. This procedure implicitly assumes that the future distribution of financial wealth will 
change  in  its  mean  and  variance  only  (not  a  very  strong  assumption)  and  that  such  a  draw  is 
independently  distributed  over  time
31  and  across  families.  We  follow  this  approach  rather  than 
simply exclude this variable from the set of recipient equations regressors, in order to warrant a 
acceptably good matching between the variances of given and received simulated transfers
32. In 
practice, we introduce an important explanatory factor in the recipient equations that, whenever 
unobservable, is substituted by a random-component whose first two moments are however not 
fixed over the simulation period but are time-varying according to the distributional evolution of the 
enlarged financial wealth among over 50 households.  
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Next, the model verifies the consistency between the total (out-and-in) flows and, every year, 
imposes the following condition to hold: 




af = af                                                                                   ( ) 11  
Where J and K are the households giving (G) and receiving (R) a transfer, respectively, while af 
is the amount of transferred financial wealth. Condition (11) ensures an accounting consistency in 
the process of inter vivos transmission. 
Should  a  family  unit  extinguish  due  to  the  death  of  the  last  remaining  member,  the  model 
simulates the (proportional) transmission of the whole wealth endowment to the heirs. To this end, 
we try to account for the main family relationships in order to define the heir stall of bequests. 
Currently CAPP_DYN allows the considering of relationships among individuals who, during the 
survey (2002), shared the same house, plus individuals who lived outside the family of origin at that 
time but whose existence was still reported by the survey’s respondents
33. We consider therefore as 
potential heirs all the children, grandchildren and common-law spouses in the initial population plus 
the children living outside (i.e. those not included in the sample) plus children and grandchildren 
born during the simulation period.  
Once the number of heir family units is defined, bequests are deterministically simulated with the 
stock of wealth being proportionally distributed among them in the form of financial wealth. Then, 
in order to ensure the accounting consistency of the wealth stocks in the economy, every year the 
model imposes the following identity to hold: 





nw = nw +Res                                  (12)  
Where J is the number of extinguishing family units in each year that pass on their wealth (G) 
mortis causa, K is the number of in-sample heirs that receive a bequest (R), nw is the net wealth 
transferred amount (in the form of financial wealth) and Res is the residual amount consisting of the 
net wealth of households that is extinguished without heirs plus the wealth shares received by out-
of-sample heirs.  
At this stage we decided to impute such a residual through calibration, where Res is distributed as 
a proportion of net worth already held by the household, in order not to alter the sample wealth 
distribution. 
 




In this section we present some selected simulation results provided by the extended version of 
CAPP_DYN including the new Wealth module. Our aim is to assess some possible outcomes on 
disposable income and wealth distribution as well as on the saving patterns of Italian households in 
the  coming  decades  (2010-2050).  The  next  future  will  be  characterized  by  two  significant 
transitions  -  in  the  demographic  structure  (particularly  pronounced  in  Italy)  and  in  the  public 
pension  system,  which  will  slowly  shift  from  quite  a  generous  (although  horizontally  unfair) 
defined benefit system (DB) to an actuarially neutral notional defined contribution regime (NDC). 
The gradual social security reforms are expected to place most of the burden on current young (and 
future) workers through a significant cut in their expected returns on social security contributions.  
Demographic changes will bring a large increase in the population share of elderly on the one 
hand, while on the other, the replacement of older cohorts – that have been characterized by a large 
number  of  individuals  (baby-boom  generations),  a  high  net  saving  rate  (despite  the  generous 
pension system) and a low number of descendants - with the later cohorts, less numerous and not 
enjoying the same social security arrangement. Nevertheless, on average, they would be able to 
benefit from a larger intergenerational transfers of private wealth.  
We consider dynamic micro simulation as an appropriate tool for shedding light on the future 
saving pattern of Italian households and on the likely distributional consequences of transitions. 
In the following sections we present some simulation results for the period (2008-2050)
34 starting 
from a look to the general trends of household propensity to save for different groups in order to 
check  their  consistency  with  model  hypotheses.  We  then  focus  on  the  evolution  of  private 
intergenerational transfers (inter vivos and bequests) and discuss how they could partially crowd-out 
- together with the role of demography - the average pro-saving effect of pension reforms. Next, we 
carry out distributional analyses on wealth and incomes in order to interpret general patterns in 
inequality in the light of some key driving factors. We finally provide some decompositions of 
inequality trends by age group and by pension regime in three key years (2008-2025-2050).  
 
6.1 Aggregate trends 
In order to get a macroeconomic picture of the saving patterns simulated by the model, figure 3 
displays aggregate results in terms of propensity to save out of base income (Y0). In particular, two 
definitions  of  savings  are  adopted:  s0,  the  liquid  savings  (i.e.  base  income  minus  consumption 
minus  the  mortgage  installment,  if  any),  and  s1,  obtained  by  considering  the  capital  share  of 
mortgage  installment  as  a  form  of  savings  (i.e.  base  income  minus  consumption  minus  annual 
mortgage interest, if any). As it can be noticed, in a first period, up to 2022, the saving propensity  
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Figure 3: General propensity to save 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
We can identify some forces driving such pattern. Figure 3 also plots the share of households 
whose head is retired. A sharp increase is recorded in this value, which increases from 35% of the 
population in 2012 to about 47% in 2045. This is a first macro-level clue of the moving back of 
savings  in  the  second  spell.  Nevertheless,  this  evidence  would  be  consistent  in  a  life  cycle 
perspective if we think of retired people in the future decades behaving differently from current 
Italian pensioners (who are still net savers at the older ages, see fig.2). Indeed, households’ life 
cycle savings pattern is expected to change, becoming increasingly more consistent with the life 
cycle theory, which is characterized by greater saving just before retirement and more dissaving 
after retirement. This is a consequence of the behavioural hypotheses at the basis of estimating the 
consumption rule. 
These remarks are further corroborated by figure 4 which, in the left panel, depicts the evolution 
of  saving  propensities  for  households  whose  head  is  working  while,  in  the  right  panel,  for 
households whose head has retired. A clearly diverging pattern can be seen between the two groups 
that currently do not have a significantly different average saving rate. The inactive-head group, 
around 2020, would even start to dis-save its private assets in order to keep its living standard that is 
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Figure 4: Propensity to save for active households (left) for retired households (right) (2008-2050) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
Pension expectations are an important parameter of the consumption rule and their evolution 
determine the initial upward trend in the propensity to save of active households. Later cohorts 
(fig.5)  are  indeed  expected  to  progressively  reduce  their  expectations  about  after-retirement 
replacement rate provided by the social security system and this, in turn, (via the internalization of 
reduced returns on contributions) is mirrored by a progressive fall in permanent income as a share 
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Figure 5: Expected replacement rate by age for different cohort (left) and the mean evolution of the 
current to permanent income ratio (2008-2050) (right). 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
Therefore, so far, we have identified two opposite forces that could lead savings in the next years. 
One is a pro-saving effect due to the internalization in expectations of pension reforms by active  
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people; the other is a counter effect – due to the interaction of future pension outcomes with the life-
cycle consumption rule - on the behavior of future pensioners, who are expected to become more 
dis-savers. 
We then isolate the saving propensity and the net worth to income age-profiles for five ten- 
years cohorts with at least 35 years of adult life in the simulation period. Figure 6 (left) displays the 
saving propensity according to the restricted definition (s0).  
In  short,  for  later  cohorts,  the  general  pattern  is  connoted  by  a  more  intense  saving  before 
retirement, followed by a significantly more pronounced dis-saving later. Moreover, moving toward 
younger cohorts, especially for the very youngest, the more intense savings effort start from 55.  
In terms of net worth to disposable income age profile (right), it is worth noting that the two 
oldest cohorts, for most of their life, have a significantly higher ratio compared to the youngest 
three cohorts, which in turn seem to fill the gap with the former group at a more advanced age (also 
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Figure 6: Propensity to save (s0) (left) and net worth to disposable income (right) age profile for 
different cohorts. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
Next, we investigate the specific role of private wealth received as a gift or bequest. Figure 7 
displays the evolution of the share of recipient/donor families of inter vivos (left) and mortis causa 
(right) transfers and of the average amount transferred. A steady increase can be observed in both 
dimensions; the share of recipient households raises from 5.3% in 2008 to 9% in 2050 while the 
average transfers increases from 26,600 euros in 2008 to 47,700 in 2050 (euros at 2002 prices), 
equivalent to a compound annual growth rate of 1.4%, a bit less than the average general growth in 
wage  (exogenously  assumed  at  about  1.7%).  However,  considering  the  product  of  the  two  
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dimensions, the mass transferred inter vivos is expected to more than triple in real terms over the 




Figure 7: Evolution of the share of iv and mc transfers recipient households and of the avg amount 
transferred 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
Concerning  the  private  wealth  transferred  mortis  causa,  the  share  of  heirs’  families  in  the 
population is expected to increase steadily from 1.5% in 2008 to 2.4% in 2050, while the evolution 
of  the  average  bequest  received  can  be  divided  into  three  sub-periods:  a  steady  and  consistent 
growth from 2008 to 2029, an explosion from 2029 to 2042 and, finally, a third period up to 2050, 
when the amount remains flat.  
In terms of average growth throughout the simulation period, the model predicts a noteworthy 
compound annual growth rate of 4.3% (with an acceleration in the central period, i.e. the time when 
the baby-boom generation is expected to pass away), well above the general growth in wages. 
Multiplying the average amount by the share of population we get a mass of wealth bequeathed in 
2050 equal to 9 times that of 2008. 
This  evidence  points  out  a  non-negligible  role  which  the  intergenerational  transmission  of 
private wealth would play in the coming decades, both in the dynamics of household accumulation 
and in wealth distribution. 
 
6.2 Distributional results 
This  section  aims  at  exploring  the  distributional  implications  of  results  provided  by  our 
simulation. Figure 8 below depicts the overall evolution in the Gini of net worth among Italian 
households in the coming decades as well as of the equivalent base income (i.e. net labour and  
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pension incomes) and equivalent disposable income (Y2) obtained by summing the base household 
income (Y0, i.e. the sum of net labour and pension incomes) with annual rents provided by house 
equity  (net of interests  on mortgage, if  any)  and income  from  enlarged financial wealth
35. Net 
wealth inequality is expected to stay fairly stable until about 2022, after when the model predicts a 
sharp increase in the Gini which would reach 0.655 in 2050. A similar path (though on a lower 
level) is recorded in equivalent base income inequality. Indeed, the Gini lies between 0.33 and 0.34 
until 2025 and would steadily increase afterwards, exceeding 0.36 in 2050. Inequality in equivalent 
overall  disposable  income  (which  includes  both  base  and  capital  incomes)  is  expected  to 
progressively increase all over the simulation period starting from 0.34 in 2008 getting to 0.37 in 
2050. 
A regression of the simulated values of wealth Gini on some explanatory variables (Tab.5, left) 
can  disclose  the  underlying  correlations  at  work  in  the  model.  As  expected,  a  crucial  role  in 
explaining wealth inequality is played by the dispersion in net labor and pension incomes (0.6 the 
coefficient). An additional variable correlated with wealth dispersion is the Gini in intergenerational 
(inter vivos) transfers (0.1 the coefficient). Finally, a strong powerful and significant regressor is the 
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Figure 8: Evolution in the Gini of net worth and income (2008-2050) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
The analysis of the role of savings in shaping inequality is a specific task of our Wealth module 
as  (following  AN,  2004)  we  explicitly  model  household  consumption  behaviour  in  a  life-cycle 
framework. A regression in differences (Tab.5, right panel) allows a better disentangling of the role 
of differences in household saving rates. To this end, we fit a linear model of the variation (i.e. the 
first difference) in Gini of wealth on variation in Gini of inter vivos transfers, contemporaneous and  
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lagged values in standard deviation of the propensity to save. In this setting, it is worth noting that 
an acceleration (slow down) in intergenerational transfer dispersion is moderately yet significantly 
associated  to  an  acceleration  (slow  down)  in  wealth  inequality.  Moreover,  while  the 
contemporaneous dispersion in saving rates is negatively correlated, with low significance, to the 
variation in wealth inequality, the two-year lag of the same explanatory variable is positively and 
significantly associated with the acceleration of inequality.  
 
 
Table 5: Regression of Gini coefficient (left panel) and its variation (right panel) on simulated data 
gini wealth  D.gini wealth 
   Coef.  Std. Err.  P>t     Coef.  Rob. Std. Err.  P>t 
gini base income  0.597  0.119  0.000  D1. gini i.v. transfs   0.032  0.016  0.045 
gini i.v. transfers  0.107  0.036  0.005  sd save propensity  -0.127  0.064  0.054 
sd save propensity  0.363  0.047  0.000  l2.sd save propensity  0.158  0.067  0.024 
Intercept  0.26  0.021  0.000  Intercept  -0.008  0.004  0.082 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
The evolution of household base income inequality, simulated by the pre-existing labour and 
pension modules of CAPP_DYN, is mainly driven by a marked increase in earnings inequality in 
the coming decades interacting with an inverse U-shaped trend in public pension income inequality. 
With respect to the evolution in the intergenerational transfers, the Gini of inter vivos components 
(giving and receiving) are both found to follow a rising trend for the whole simulation period. On 
the other hand, the bequests inequality displays a decreasing trend on a level which is, however, 
extremely high. The Gini, in fact, starts from 0.76 in 2008 and converges towards 0.6 in 2050. In 
sum, a within cohort pro-inequality effect of intergenerational private wealth transmission is at least 
partially  counterbalanced  by  a  within  recipients  (due  to  primary  accumulation  for  new  born 
families) and an obvious between generations redistributive effect. However, this within groups 
evidence does not imply, for household population as a whole, intergenerational transfers reduce 
inequality,  rather,  on  the  opposite,  the  decreased  inequality  within  the  group  of  recipients  (or 
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Figure 9: Gini intergenerational transfers (2008-2050) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
Concerning the dispersion in household saving rates, figure 10 shows the predicted evolution in 
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Figure 10: Across household standard deviation in the saving rates 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
In particular, it depicts an erratic but growing pattern with a particular high and over-the-trend 
dispersion period between 2023 and 2037. Indeed, this spell coincides with the initial acceleration 
and  then  marked  increase  in  wealth  inequality.  Therefore,  the  model  points  out  a  noticeable 
heterogeneous capacity  and attitude to save and invest among  Italian households in the central 
period  of  the  simulation,  which  shows  an  important  demographic  transition  coupled  with  the 
phasing-in of the social security system toward the NDC regime. This increased distance in capital  
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accumulation  among high-saving and low-saving households would  even boost the steady-state 
inequality.  
Summing  up,  the  model  suggests  the  likely  role  of  three  possible  channels  through  which 
inequality  will  increase  in  the  coming  decades:  firstly,  an  increased  dispersion  in  earnings  and 
public pensions; secondly, a rising (or very high) dispersion in intergenerational transfers of private 
wealth, coupled with a significant increase in their amount; and thirdly, a widening - sharp in the 
central period - gap between high-saving and low-saving households. 
 
6.2.1  Some inequality and poverty decompositions 
To further investigate worrying distributional trends in the coming decades, we perform some 
additional inequality and poverty
36 analyses, at some selected points in time.  
First, by focusing on the household head’s age distribution in the first quintile of the equivalent 
disposable income (fig.11), it is interesting to note that, while in 2008 this is mostly composed of 
young household heads, in 2050 the distribution would become bimodal with the first mode at ages 
around  25  and  the  second  mode  after  70.  The  model  seems  therefore  suggesting  an  emerging 
income inequality polarization at the extreme ages in the coming decades.  
A further confirmation can be drawn from the decomposition of inequality by age classes (tab.6). 
While currently the highest within inequality connotes the group of the youngest (under 35), in 2025 
and, even more in 2050, it could also increasingly apply to the oldest group (over 65). This pattern 
in inequality would be coupled with stable high poverty incidence among the young and an upward 





Figure 11: Kernel density household head’s age in the first quintile 
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This evidence is the result of the ceasing re-distributional role of public pensions as well as a very 
heterogeneous pattern in private accumulation among households. This trend could radically change 
the distributional picture of Italy which, currently, is connoted by a lower income inequality and 
poverty incidence among elderly compared to other age groups. Moreover, it suggests the between 
age classes massive redistribution in favor of elderly (not showed here) could be associated with an 
impressive within elderly inequality in living standards. 
 
 
Table 6: Gini (left panel) and poverty incidence (right panel) of equivalent disposable income by 
age classes 
GINI   Poverty incidence (FGT0) 
Age  2008  2025  2050  2008  2025  2050 
<=35  0.447  0.445  0.454  0.444  0.462  0.471 
36-45  0.333  0.323  0.322  0.249  0.253  0.223 
46-55  0.309  0.331  0.317  0.176  0.199  0.144 
56-65  0.303  0.329  0.339  0.140  0.176  0.148 
>65  0.274  0.311  0.361  0.095  0.130  0.185 
All    0.221   0.226   0.224 
Between Ineq GE(0)  0.022  0.023  0.025 
Within ineq GE(0)  0.582  0.537  0.585 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
A final decomposition concerns the public pension schemes (tab.7). This analysis (carried out for 
2025 and 2050 only because in 2008 we are still unable to observe NDC pensioners) points out the 
threat of a transition phase in around 2025, during which new NDC pensioners, representing nearly 
one third of all retired individuals, would face a particular severe inequality (0.38 the Gini against 
0.28 among other pensioners) and a particular harsh poverty incidence (34% against 8%). This trend 
would characterize also the ensuing decades (in 2050, 7 pensioners out of 10 are expected to fall 
under the NDC regime) though to a less dramatic extent.  
 
 
Table 7: Gini and poverty incidence of equivalent disposable income by pension regime 
Equivalent Disposable Income  2025  2050 
PAYGO 
SCHEME  Ineq (Gini)  Poverty 




DB/MIXED  0.280  0.079  73%  0.330  0.095  30%  
 
34
NDC  0.383  0.337  27%  0.368  0.240  70% 
All pensioners  0.317  0.149  100%  0.364  0.196  100% 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CAPP_DYN simulation results (2008-2050). 
 
 
The above analysis provides some useful insights to policy makers especially about the worrying 
initial phasing in of the new social security regime, when some individuals, retiring with a public 
coverage that is considerably smaller than the one enjoyed by previous generations, might not be 
endowed  with  private  savings,  with  possible  serious  troubles  in  getting  an  adequate  level  of 
consumption  after  retirement.  These  results  raise  also  questions  concerning  the  provision  of 
appropriate labour market policies that will able to encourage the elderly to keep working and 
compensatory  schemes  for  individuals  falling  under  the  new  NDC  system  with  discontinuous 
careers and an insufficient level of contributions that will in turn affect their pensions. Moreover, 
since the magnitude of household savings response to social security reforms also depends on how 
fast and accurately young workers will revise their expectations in the direction suggested by the 
reforms themselves, policies aimed at improving workers’ awareness about their pension wealth 
would encourage adjustments in private accumulation, which could soften perverse distributional 
consequences related to the demographic and pension transitions. 
 
7.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The long run distributional effects of demographic transitions and structural reforms in social 
security, adopted to cope with them, are largely unknown and not easy to predict. In such new 
scenario, private wealth becomes crucial both in determining overall wellbeing after retirement and, 
ex  ante,  in  affecting  saving/investing  as  well  as  retirement  decisions.  Despite  its  growing 
importance,  this  issue  has  not  yet  been  analysed  in  depth,  especially  in  its  distributional 
implications. The present work aims at filling this gap by endowing the Italian dynamic micro 
simulation model CAPP_DYN with a module accounting for the role of private asset accumulation 
and spend down. The joint analysis of private wealth accumulation and social security wealth is 
particularly important in order to get a reliable evaluation of household disposable incomes and 
standard of living in the coming decades.  
Since reforms are likely to affect households’ accumulation patterns, we attempt to account for 
possible  savings  reactions  by  clasping  the  consumption  rule  onto  a  life  cycle  framework.  In 
particular, policy parameters enter into the saving decision by means of subjective expectations 
about  pensions  outcomes.  Moreover,  we  consider  the  modeling  of  private  wealth  transmission  
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among  generations  as  a  fundamental  task  in  getting  a  more  accurate  picture  of  the  future 
distribution of economic resources. To this end, we provide the Wealth module with a probabilistic 
intergenerational  transfers  sub-module.  We  conceive  the  endogenization  of  savings  and  wealth 
transfers as well as their relationships with inequality as an original contribution of our model to the 
existing microsimulation literature. 
Simulated results for the period 2008-2050 predict a marked rise in household disposable income 
inequality in the future. The analysis highlights the likely role of three possible channels through 
which inequality will increase in the coming decades: firstly, an increased dispersion in earnings 
and public pensions; secondly, a rising dispersion in intergenerational transfers of private wealth; 
and thirdly, a widening gap - sharp in the central period - between high-saving and low-saving 
households. Moreover, a polarization at the extreme ages in income inequality and poverty would 
emerge in the next decades, with an increasing share of future pensioners facing serious troubles in 
keeping their living standard at an adequate level.  
  
Appendix A: SHIW Data 
 
The  Bank  of  Italy’s  Survey  of  Households  Income  and  Wealth  (SHIW 
http://www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/indcamp/bilfait;internal&action=_setlanguage.action?LANGU
AGE=en)  collects  information  on  economic  situation  -  income  and  wealth  -  savings  and 
consumption behaviour - and social features of a sample of families in the period 1977-2006. Since 
1989, a panel section composed of households already interviewed in the previous wave is provided 
for. We exploited this component in our estimates of the consumption rule. 
Concerning wealth, analyses based on the comparison between micro and macro data showed the 
amounts  recorded  in  the  SHIW  under-estimate  both  real  and  financial  components  of  wealth 
(Brandolini et al., 2004). In 2002 the total financial assets estimates derived from the survey is 
about one third of the corresponding value from Financial Accounts (Bonci et al., 2005). To this 
end,  concerning  misreporting,  no  comparable  data  are  available  for  real  wealth  in  the  official 
National Accounts, therefore we do not make any adjustment for the level of reported real wealth. 
Finally, concerning financial wealth, we employ the adjusted values provided by D’Aurizio et al. 
(2006)
37  which  matched  the  2002  SHIW  wave  with  anonymous  data  from  a  sample  survey  of 
customers of the Unicredit group on the assets actually owned by the customers.  
By using advanced econometric techniques, this procedure determines a substantial correction for 
private bonds and mutual funds, particularly significant for single household and increasing with  
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age. We do not employ the adjusted data in the econometric stage (except for the estimation of the 
risk propensity, reported in appendix B), but we replace them in the initial population (SHIW 2002) 
in order to simulate more realistic distributions. 
The 2002 distribution of net worth in Italy is pretty unequal and right skewed with a mean of 
212,000 euros, a median of 133,000 and the Gini is equal to 0.56. Financial assets aggregate, as 
expected, is the most unequally and skewed distributed (Gini is 0.63 with a skewness of 11.58) and 
its mean value is about 58,000 euros. Finally, real estate (without corrections) is the most important 
wealth component with a mean of 162,000 euros and Gini of 0.59. 
 
Appedix B: SHARE data and sample selection 
 
We  base  our  econometric  analysis  on  the  first  wave  (2004)  of  SHARE  (http://www.share-
project.org/) – composed of about 32,000 individuals whereof 3,100 Italians – focusing on inter 
vivos monetary transfers towards children (and grandchildren) living out of the family of origin. 
This micro data source has the unusual feature - not found in other surveys - of collecting detailed 
information on respondents’ children living out of the family of origin and allows the reconstruction 
of  a  correspondence  between  parents’  and  children  characteristics  (influencing  transfers)  and  a 
donor-recipient matching which is hardly obtainable by using other sources.  
In order to evaluate the determinants of transfers we further restrict the sample by considering 
households with children living out of the family of origin. Such a selection reduces the sample size 
to 16,871 households whereof 1,533 are Italian. Such a size does not allow to focus the analysis on 
Italian families only, but we will control for systematic differences from other countries by means 
of dummy variables. 
In  SHARE,  inter  vivos  financial  transfers  are  defined  as  “gifts,  financial  or  material  support 
(other than food or shared house) of at least 250 euros from/to someone within or outside the 
household”. For our purposes we isolate transfers towards children or grandchildren living outside 
the respondent household. 
For Italy, the share of donor households is around 21.6%, slightly below the European average, 
and is substantially above the information emerging from SHIW (2002): according to this latter 
source, households making at least a gift over their whole life are about 5%, while those who 
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1 PENSIM2 in Great Britain, MINT3 in the United States or SESIM III in Sweden are some of the most relevant 
examples. 
2 For a description of the pre-existing structure of CAPP_DYN, see Mazzaferro and Morciano (2009). 
3 The main implication is that feedbacks from wealth to demographic and occupational decision are not allowed for. A 
further development of the research will be the sequential integration of the Wealth Module with the pre-existing 
modules. 
4 See Appendix A for details on SHIW and adjustment of financial wealth. 
5  CAPP_DYN  is  a  discrete-time  annual  model,  while  our  main  estimation  dataset  (the  Bank  of  Italy  Survey  of 
Household Income and Wealth) has a two-years frequency. This fact causes an underestimation of persistence in the 
simulated  dynamic  models.  We  are  aware  of  this  problem,  but,  at  the  state  of  the  art  a  yearly  panel  data  source 
containing the needed information is not available for Italy so. We thus believe the advantages of fitting a better overall  
model (especially for the consumption rule) outweigh the drawback of an underestimated persistence. 
6 In the benchmark scenario, we have adjusted the average return from Muzzicato et al. (2002) - amounting to about 
2.5% over the 1970-2007 period - by imputing a lower (very long run) rate of 2%. At the same time we adopt a 
moderate 8% standard deviation, close to that estimated by Cannari et al. (2008) for houses prices in Italy. 
7 This aggregate is composed of stocks, mutual funds, private bonds, foreign government bonds, shares of limited 
liability companies. 
8 Non-risky assets include bank and postal deposits CDs, PCTs, BFPs and government securities. We also added real 
(tangible) goods other than real estate. 
9 A static model determines initial conditions for newborn households. 
10 In the benchmark simulation, we assume real returns of 3% with a standard deviation of 18% and an excess of 
kurtosis of 2.4% for risky assets. These values amount to a weighted average of short, medium and very long run 
returns for Italy computed by Dimson et al. (2006). Figures for a wide set of countries are available in the DMS Global 
Returns database. Future improvements aim at introducing the role of systemic risk in private accumulation and use of 
alternative, more realistic, methods for projecting equity returns. 
11 If a household extinguishes before the debt has been repaid, it simply transmits its overall net worth to its heirs 
according to the rule defined in section 5. 
12 Since SHIW data seems to severely under-report the official trade flows in the housing market, we still fit the 
econometric models in order to model systematic differences in house equity decisions according to some observable 
characteristics,  aligning the totals to match external aggregate data. According to ISTAT between 2002 and 2008 in 
Italy about a 4.5 percent of households per year were involved in house equity purchasing/building. We assume this 
frequency to be stable over the simulation.  
13 In Italy, private sector employees receive an additional, and sizeable, severance indemnity at retirement called TFR 
(Trattamento di Fine Rapporto, i.e. end-of-service allowance). In practice, the TFR is a deferred share of wage, which 
can also be partially redeemed in some special cases, and in particular for the purchase of the 1
st house or can be fully or 
partially transferred to complementary pension funds. 
It is computed as 6.91% of the yearly gross wage and can be reasonably approximated with one gross monthly wage. It 
accrues at an yearly rate equal to 1.5% plus 75% the inflation.   
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14 The average incidence of mortgage repayment on household income is around 30% in Italy (Rossi, 2008). 
15 Actual consumption cannot exceed the sum of all disposable households income and the “liquid” financial wealth [(1- 
￿
t)AF] net of any mortgage installment. 
16 For new born households the initial condition is estimated by means of a static FE model. 
17 The assumptions are that under 30 active children will leave the family of origin at 30, while over 30 active children 
will exit within one year. 
18 The annual real general increase in wage is assumed to be 1.20% up to 2016,  1.60% from 2016 to 2020, 1.90% from 
2021 to 2030 and 2.00% from 2031 to  2050. 
19 For an analysis of retirement expectations and pension reforms on SHIW, see Bottazzi et. al, 2006. 
20 This correlation would violate one of the basic assumptions of independence in OLS regression. Therefore, as a 
check, we carry out a Hausman test to verify if differences between an OLS estimates of exp_repratio with plan_ret_age 
among the regressors and a 2SLS estimates are big enough to suggest OLS estimates are not consistent. Actually, we 
find a significant difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates (chi-square = 26.54, df =1, p = 0.0000) and the reason 
for the inconsistency of OLS is endogeneity of plan_ret_age. 
21 A drop in consumption after retirement still remains to be clarified. Several theoretical and empirical works propose 
different explanations  for this stylized fact (Hurd and  Rohwedder, 2008; Laitner and  Silverman 2005; Fernandèz-
Villaverde and Krueger, 2005. For Italy, Miniaci et al., 2009) 
22 We also estimate a static version of the model for newborn households with no lagged value of consumption to set the 
initial condition. 
23 Following Ando and Nicoletti Altimari (2004), we divided the household population in five categories: singles, 
nuclear families (two spouses plus children, if any), non-nuclear families (households with spouses and active children 
only, not properly composite non-nuclear families
23), nuclear single headed and non-nuclear single headed. 
24 For instance, as far as we understand in SESIM III the transmission of private wealth is not explicitly modeled, that is 
a proper link across following generations is not allowed for, meaning that at an accumulation (for gifts and bequests) in 
a group in the sample does not correspond an equal and opposite de-cumulation in another group.  
25 Of course the latter dataset, given its derived nature, contains only a limited number of information that is directly 
related to the new observational units (i.e. the children of the original observational units).  
26  Financial  wealth  includes  bank  accounts,  government  and  corporate  bonds,  stocks,  mutual  funds,  individual 
retirement accounts, contractual savings for housing and life insurance policies. 
27 The dependent variable in the outcome equation is the level amount of received transfer, rather than the ratio to 
financial wealth, information on children’s household wealth being not available in the data. 
28 We employ it in the selection equation only, in order to satisfy the exclusion restriction for the Heckman correction. 
Such augmentation proves to be opportune in controlling for the selection bias, as Mills ratio coefficient is extremely 
significant and positive. 
29 Therefore, we do not control for selectivity that however, in the case of recipients, is likely to be less severe than for 
donors. 
30 This strategy stems from the empirical evidence that the current over 50s’ financial wealth distribution approximates 
to a log-normal distribution. 
31 This is a stronger, less realistic assumption. Nevertheless, only few households are selected for receiving an inter 
vivos transfer more that once or twice in a life cycle so this implicit assumption proves to be quite innocuous in 
distributional terms. 
 
32On the opposite, the exclusion of such a covariate (which explains much of the selection/outcome equations) in the 
recipient equation  would have implied a  much lower variability in the predicted amount of  the received transfers 
(inflows) compared to the variance in the predicted amount of the given transfers (outflows). This fact would have 
ended up making the transfer sub-module work as a progressive tax-benefit module, with obvious distorting rebounds 
on the transmission of inequality among generations.  
33 For these individuals the assumption is that they die after their parents with probability equal to 1. 
34  In  the  present  work  we  show  results  according  to  assumptions  on  returns  of  the  benchmark  scenario  only.  An 
extended version of this section, containing more detailed results and alternative exogenous scenarios is provided in 
http://www.capp.unimo.it/pubbl/cappapers. 
35 Although in the simulation program we do not explicitly account for the role of capital incomes (interests, dividends, 
rents) on the household consumption behaviour, that instead depends on stocks, in order to give an evaluation of the 
overall disposable household income, in the post-simulation analyses, we assume house equity to provide a 3.50% 
annual rent (imputed for first, owner occupied dwellings and actual for other houses), the non risky component of the 
enlarged financial wealth to provide 1% real interest rate and the risky component 3% (interests and dividends). 
36 We set the threshold at 60% the median equivalent disposable income. OECD equivalence scale.  
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37 We are grateful to  Leandro D’Aurizio, Ivan  Faiella,  Stefano Iezzi and  Andrea Neri  for providing  us  with data 
adjusted for under-reporting resulting from their work “L’under-reporting della ricchezza finanziaria nell’Indagine sui 
Bilanci delle Famiglie Italiane”. 